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J.: In Interstate Transportation of Intoxicants by Private Means and
EDITOIAL NOTES

however, decided in the leading case on the question,2 2 and has
since frequently held,2 3 that the regulation of rates is an exercise
of the police power, and there seems to be no real ground for
doubting that decision.
Moreover, as we have seen, the Supreme Court has recently held
that a regulation by a public service commission changing the
rates fixed by contract between a consumer and a puhlic service
corporation does not impair the obligation of a contract within
the meaning of the Constitution for the reason, assigned by the
court, that the power to regulate rates is a police power and that
"it is settled that neither the 'contract clause' nor the 'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the state to
establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained
away, and is inalienable even by express grant, and that all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise."
Now, if, as the court reasons in this case, a state cannot grant to
a public service corporation the power to contract away this right
to regulate rates, it is submitted that for the very same reasons a
state cannot grant to a municipal corporation the power to contract away the right to regulate rates. It would seem, therefore,
that not only consistency but analogous precedent and sound principle would lead to the conclusion that a state should never, even
by express legislative grant, be permitted to waive its sovereign
right to regulate rates, a conclusion, which because of ever-changing conditions and of the vital importance to the public of the
retention of the right, is, it would seem, "a consummation devoutly to be wished."
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In a recent Virginia case,' the defendant had been indicted for
bringing intoxicating liquor into the state in violation of the federal "bone-dry law," usually lumovn as the Reed Amendment,
=Mrunn v. Illinois, supra, note 1.
=See, e. g., Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service
ncte 1.
ISickel v. Commonwealth, 99 S. E. 678 (1919).
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which forbids any one to "order. purchase, or cause intoxicating
liquors to be transported in interstate commerce . . . . into any
State . . . the laws of which State . . . prohibit the manufacture2
or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes."
The court holds that if the one charged with the offense "uses no
instrumentality of interstate commerce and intends to use the
whiskey so acquired solely for his personal purposes, he does not
violate the federal Act." The decision is made to turn upon the
fact, as the court says, that the transportation of the liquor into
the state was by "private means" and not "by an instrumentality
of interstate conuerce." The Court concludes that portion of
its opinion which deals with this point by saying:
"The language of the statute is, 'to be transported in interstate commerce,' which was, in all good reason, held to mean
by the use of the 'facilities of interstate commerce,' and was
not extended to transportation by private means."
The court bases this distinction upon words found in the case
of United States v. Hill," reading as follows:
"Congress enacted this statute [Reed Amendment] because
of its belief that in States prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors for beverage purpose the facilities of interstate commerce should be denied to the introdue,
tion of intoxicants by means of interstate commerce."
The words the Virginia court emphasizes are "the facilities of
interstate commerce," and from their use reaches the conclusion
that to come within the statute an "instrumentality of interstate
commerce" must have been used and that the use by defendant
of "private means" of transportation is not the use of an "instrumentality of interstate commerce."
It is respectfully submitted that the conclusion reached by the
court is erroneous for three reasons. In the first place, the words
taken from the Hill Case are given a meaning and an emphasis
not intended by the court. The question whether it was necessary
that an instrumentality of interstate commerce be used in order
to create a violation of the Reed Amendment was not raised or at
issue in that case. The question at issue was whether transporta2

Act of March 3, 1917, 39 STAT. AT L. 1069, c. 162, BABNES' FED. CODE, §§8352,
S915.
3248 U. S. 420, 427 (1919).
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tion of liquor by an interstate passenger upon his person and
for his own personal use, was interstate commerce. The lower
court held that such facts constituted interstate transportationbut
not interstate commerce. The Supreme Court's holding was centered on the point that "interstate commerce" includes transportation for personal use as well as for commercial purposes.4 The
words taken by the Virginia court and made the basis of its
holding in the principal case were clearly incidental only and not
intended to interpret the statute as the Virginia court holds.
It would be noted that in no other place in the opinion in the
Hill Case is reference made to instrumentalities of commerce.
In the second place, it would seem clear that the holding that
"private means" may not constitute an "instrumentality of interstate commerce" is erroneous. We presume that by "private
means" is intended a means of transportation owned and used by
the person owning and transporting the liquor. Therefore, the
holding of the Virginia court is that. one who transports his own
property from one state into another by his own vehicle, or carries it across the line on foot, or drives his cattle or sheep across
the state line, does not thereby engage in interstate commerce.
The cases do not support such a distinction. There are several
instances where the use of private means of transportation has
been recognized or held to be interstate commerce. Where the
defendants were transporting their own goods from state to state
in their own pipe lines, it was held that they were engaged in
interstate commerce even though they bad never held themselves
out as transporting oil for others.6 This is pointed out in the
Hll Case.7 A railway operating its own construction train which
hauls its own rails and products from a point in one state to a
point in another state, is engaged interstate commerce.8 Transportation of liquor from one state to another in one's own buggy
'See article by Thomas P. Hardman, "Does the 'Bone-dry' Law prohibit the
Interstate Transportation of Intoxicants by the Owner for Personal Use," 25 W.
VA. L. Q. 222, in which the decision of the lower court in a companion case to
United States v. Hill is criticised and the point made upon which the United
States Supreme Court reversed ttbe lower court.
The Hill Case makes it clear that whether the owner transports the property
across the line for his own use or not is of no consequence In determining whether
or not it is interstate commerce.
That question is eliminated.
GPipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 560, 58 L. Ed. 1459, 34 S. Ct. 956 (1914).
724S U. S. at p. 424.
$United ;States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 146 Fed. 486 (D. C., S. D., Ia.
1906).
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and for one's own use is interstate commerce.0 In another case'"
the court held that personal carriage of liquor from one state into
another was interstate commerce.-' In a recent United States
Supreme Court case12 the fact that "resort was had to personal
carriage as a means of moving the prohibited articles" was held
not to prevent such transportation from being subject to a law
passed under the power of Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce.
Private means of transportation may include transportation on
foot without the use of any artificial agency but this may not prevent its being interstate commerce. One or two of the cases noted
in the last paragraph may have been of this sort. Thus, it has
been admitted that a flock of 10,000 sheep driven on foot from
one state through another on the way to market is being transported in interstate commerce. 3 They were driven over the public domain and through pastures, apparently not following the
highways. The United States Supreme Court has held that a
Missouri statute providing that no Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle
"shall be driven or otherwise conveyed into" Missouri at certain
times of the year, affected interstate commerce and was therefore
unconstitutional. 14 That the use of some artificial or m,chanical
means of locomotion is unnecessary to make transportation interstate commerce also seems clear from words used by the Supreme
Court twenty-six years ago: "The thousands of people who daily
pass and repass over this bridge [connecting two states] may be
as truly Said to be engaged in commerce as if they were shipping
cargoes of merchandise. ''Z: From this it will be seen that the
court regards a bridge as a sufficient instrumentality without the
use of any means of locomotion other than one's legs. Therefore,
passing from one state to another on a highway must be interstate
commerce. It is under its power to regulate interstate commerce
9State v. Holleyman, 55 S. C. 207, 33 S. E. 366 (1899).

Transportation of intoxi-

cants by automobile from one state to another is interstate commerce.
Westbrook,

250 Fed. 636 (1918).

Ex porte

See also Malcolm v. U. S., 256 Fed. 363 (C. C.

A., 4th Cir., 1919).
5

' Alexander v. State 3 Okla. Cr. 478, 106 Pac. 988 (1910).
nSee discussion of these cases by Thomas P. Hardman, 25

.W.

VA. L.

Q. at pp.

228-229.
2
' United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 532, 57 L. Ed. 950, 33 S. Ct. 595 (1913).
13Kelly v. Rhodes, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 Pac. 593, 39 L. R. A. 594 (1898), s. c.,
9 Wyo. 352, 63 Pac. 935 (1901).
1"Railroad v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. Ed. 527 (2877).
"Covington, etc. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 218-19, 38 L. Ed.
962, 14 S. Ct. 1087 (1894).
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that Congress has constructed highways such as the National Pike.
Defendants in the principal case may have used a road from
Maryland into Virginia. If they did, then they used the road as
an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
In emphasizing the mneans of transportation as the test as to
whether there is interstate commerce, it would seem that the
Virginia court crrs. In a recent leading case touching what is
interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court says:
"Importation into one State from another is the indispensable
element, the test, of interstate commerce? 6 Again the Supreme
Court says: "The means of transportation of persons and freight
between the States does not change the character of the business
as one of commerce.'"
The same thought is expressed in an
earlier case where the Supreme Court says: "The language of
the grant [of power to regulate interstate commerce] makes no
reference to the instrumentalities by which commerce may be
carried on."'s If the "indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce" is importation, it follows that the means of transportation, whether "private means" or not, is a matter of no
consequence and, also, that "the power to regulate it [interstate
coimnerce] embraces all the instruments by which such commerce
may be conducted."' 9 Following the same line of thought the Supreme Court has said that the "powers thus granted are not confined to instrumentalities of commerce . . . in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the
country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and
circumstances. They extend from the horse with its rider to the
stage-coach, from the sailing vessel to the steamboat, from the
coach and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to
the telegraph.'"0
In the third place, it is submitted that a distinction which holds
that transportation by "private means" is not interstate commerce is not practical and would leaa to unfortunate results.
Whenever one desired to escape federal regulation under some
law affecting interstate commerce he would see to it that the trans'$International

Textbook Co. v,.

Pigg, 217 U. B.

CL17 481 (1910).
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114
S. Ct. 826 (1885).
'sPaul v. Virginia, 8 Wal. 168, 183,

91, 107, 54 L.

Ed. 678, 30 S.

T. S. 196. 203, 29 L. Ed.

19 L. Ed

357

15S, 5

(1868).

"OWelton v. State of Miseourl, 41 U. 3. 275, 280, 23 L. Ed. 347 (1875).
"OPensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Urion Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1. 9. 24 L.
Ed. 708 (1877).
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Vortation was by "private means." If he desired to escape state
-regulation he would choose other than "private means" of transportation. This would certainly result in frustration, in many
instances, of the purposes of federal and state statutes depending
-for validity upon whether they were regulations of interstate or
,of intrastate commerce respectively.
On the question involved in the Hill Case, the Supreme Court
declared that Congress in enacting the Reed Amendment had in
mind the "well-known and often declared meaning of interstate
commerce." It is equally true that there is no ground for belief
that as to the means of transportation used in carrying on interstate commerce Congress had in mind anything but the "wellknown and often declared meaning of interstate commerce" as
set forth in the cases herein considered. Again quoting from the
Hill Case, "the meaning of the [Reed Amendment] must be found
in the language in which it is expressed, when, as here, there is no
:ambiguity in the terms of the law." There appears to be nothing in the act itself or in the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting it to sustain the distinction supported by the Virginia
court.
There is only one decision which lends support to the doctrine
,f the Virginia court. This is a decision of the United States
District Court, sitting in Colorado,' holding that there was not
a violation of the Reed Amendment where the defendant transported from Wyoming into Colorado in his own automobile five
,luarts of whiskey intended for his own personal use and not for
2
sale. The court admits that its conclusion is not free from doubt
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court apparently has
never drawn the distinction relied upon by the Virginia court,
and it would seem, did not intend to do so in the case upon which
the Virginia court relied, and in view of the fact that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held transportation by "private means" to
be interstate commerce and has said that the essential test is the
transportation, and, because it is believed that such a distinction'
is impractical in operation, it is submitted that the Virginia court
-has erred in drawing the distinction we have mentioned.
-H. C. J.
"United States v. Simpson, 257 Fed. 860 (1919).
=Incidentally, the court held differently from the Virginia court on the question
-whether the indictment must allege that the transportation was not for one of
-the four permitted purposes, viz., "scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical
]purposes."
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